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One prominent feature of the affluent society is consumer credit-'
Credit suppliers try to minimize risk by buying information on
prospective borrowers from specialized reporting bureaus.2 Accuracy
is important to those seeking information; it is critical to those re-
ported on. But mistakes are common. Their detrimental impact on
the subjects of credit reports may be great, and the prospect of central-
ized records only portends a wider distribution of harmful informa-
tion. Discovery of mistakes by the subject is made difficult by industry
secrecy. Thus, relief is seldom sought. Further, rare attempts to gain
judicial relief have been stymied by an inappropriate application of
the defamation doctrine.
To deal with some of these problems, Congress has recently passed
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).8 It is a first, if short, step
toward solution, but may cause more problems than it solves. This
Note will identify the injuries and costs of credit reporting and suggest
that enterprise liability and further legislation are required for the
protection of the consumer.'
I. Consumer credit includes short term, non-installment debt, including charge ac-
counts, debts for professional services, and credit cards, and longer term installment
debts, such as conditional sales contracts for consumer durables, home repair and modern-
ization loans and personal loans.
Total consumer credit outstanding exceeds $112 billion. U.S. BuRAu oF THz CzNSUS,
STATSTCAL ABsrRAcr OF m Urr STATES 460 (1969). It is extended at the rate of $3
billion per month. T=e, Dec. 20, 1968, at 79. Its growth in size and importance is one
of the main economic developments of this century. In 1930, consumer credit totalled
$5.8 billion and was less than 8% of disposable personal income. In 1949 it had risen to
$17 billion and 8.9%. US. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HisrOruCAL STATSTICS OF Tm UNrE
STAT.S, COLONIAL Tnus To 1957, Tables X 415-422, F 6-9 (1960). Consumer credit ias
equal to 19% of disposable personal income in 1969 U.S. BuREAu or THE CENsus, STATIS-
TICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNIED STATES 317 (1969).
2. These are to be distinguished from credit collection bureaus, which attempt to
collect delinquent debts for creditors, although on occasion the credit bureau i.'ll both
report and collect. Credit reporting bureaus are sometimes distinguished from "retail
credit bureaus" whose function is to supply credit information to a group of retail mer-
chants in a community. The difference is far from clear, and for purposes of this Note
it is assumed that all arguments pertinent to what I call credit reporting bureaus also
pertain to "retail credit bureaus."
3. Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601-622, 15 US.CA. §§ 1681-1631t (Supp. 1971). For a
discussion of the provisions and shortcomings of the Act, see pp. 1061-67 ifra.
4. For an excellent treatment of the whole problem of information gathering, vth an
emphasis on problems of privacy, see Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age, 67
McH. L Rzv. 1091 (1969). See also Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy:
Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969); Karst, The Files: Legal Controls Over the
Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONrEmP. Paon. 342 (1966;
Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in an Affluent Society, 33 LAw & CoNTzm. Pr o. 641 1963;
WHEELER, ON RwcRo: Fffs ANro Dosss iN AmcA LuE (1969).
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I. The Market for Credit Information
A. Nature of Credit Reporting
Considerations of time and expense underlie the credit grantors'
reliance on reporting bureaus for information. Bureaus sell capsule
histories-descriptions of an individual's financial, personal and public
life.6 Almost every important transaction a person attempts to engage
in, other than a cash purchase, will involve a credit check, and the
transaction wl depend on the report.
Credit reporting bureaus have two primary sources of information,
their investigators and their customers. The typical credit investigation
is not conducted in a manner that compels confidence in the report.
Taking an average of 30 minutes, 7 an initial investigaton is carried out
by an inspector who is usually paid on a piecework basis. He may re-
ceive $1.80, about half of the bureau fee, and must prepare each report.8
In addition to depending on their own investigators most credit re-
porting bureaus receive and record the credit records of their
customer's debtors.
9
5. The Bank of America, for instance, turned over eight million pieces of information
on individual credit to Credit Data Corporation, a California-based credit reporting
bureau which maintains files on over twenty million persons and is adding new files at
the rate of fifty thousand per week. Hearings, infra at 83.84. Credit Data estimates that
it would take five years to have a file on every American on their compttter tapes.
A trade group of 2200 local credit bureaus, the Associated Credit Bureaus of America
(A.C.B. of A) have ninety million on file and issued 97.1 million credit reports in 1967 to
over 400,000 customers in 36,000 places in this country and abroad. Hearings on Commer-
cial Credit Bureaus Before a Subcomm. on Invasion of Privacy of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., at 5, 64 (1968). [Hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings.]
6. Credit decisions are based on "the three Cs"--capital, capacity, and character.
BLAcK, Buy Now PAY LATER 46 (1961). These include the subject's net worth, earning
capacity in the future, and debt paying record, although the penumbra of "character"
extends much further. Credit reports mix personal, sensitive, and public record matter.
The typical credit file includes personal identity, employment history, public records such
as arrests, law suits, filed judgments, marriage, divorces and bankruptcies. Credit history,
size of charge and bank accounts, "slow pay" or "no pay" records, defaults, and other
data are included. For special credit investigations, such as those for Insurance com-
panies, information on personal character, habits and reputation is obtained primarily
from conversations with one's neighbors, employer, landlord and fellow workers. 115
CONG. REc. 2410 (1969).
Some large credit bureaus do not include capital or capacity and rely mainly on char.
acter. Credit Data's files contain the information that a person is a homeowner only if there
is an outstanding mortgage loan on it. They record that he is employed, but do not record
salary since employment is considered only a secondary means of identification. Hearings,
supra note 5, at 67, 88.
7. 115 CONG. REe. 2410, 2413 (Jan. 31, 1969). This investigation is required to set up
a file and is done at the request of a credit grantor which requires a report on someone
for whom the bureau has no record. This is common for insurance companies. Many
creditors merely reject the applicant if the credit bureaus they patronize have no record
at all on the person.
8. V. PACAIR, THE NAKED SociETY 176 (1964). This is the initial report. Later reports
on the same subject are considerably cheaper varying between 40-630. Hearings, supra
note 5, at 157.
9. The Bank of America relies exclusively on credit reports and turns all Its credit
records over to Credit Data Corporation. See note 5, supra.
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The bureau does not check further or analyze the information from
either source.10 Data is simply collected, organized and transmitted. In-
formation users normally telephone the bureau, listen to the report,
and make an immediate decision without verifying the information.
They assume that the credit bureau has done that already.
Most people are unaware of either the existence of their credit file,
and its location or its contents, and, thus, do not inspect it. Moreover,
contracts between credit bureaus and subscribers may have a non-dis-
closure clause in which the subscriber pledges not to show the report
to the subject. The bureau desires subscriber secrecy to protect itself
from lawsuits based on erroneous reports.
It is unlikely that the subject will know that his application for
credit has been rejected when the cause is an unfavorable report.
Credit grantors file away applications they reject to avoid offending
the applicant by a straightforward statement of unacceptability. He will
simply never hear from the store, insurance company, loan company,
bank or employer again, and not know why."
A credit bureau may consult with a subject to advise him how to
improve his credit rating, but it normally will not show him the report
or mention specfic details. 12 This secrecy and reluctance to disclose
information to the subject of the report deprives the credit reporting
system of a much needed method of accuracy control. As long as there
is no feedback, bureaus will be unaware of correctible mistakes and
will have little incentive to find them. 13
B. Injuries the Subject May Suffer
Reports that create a false impression of the subject's actual conduct
in the minds of decision makers constitute an obvious injury to the
10. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 88.
11. 115 CoNG. Rac. 2410, 2412 (Jan. 31, 1969).
12. A familiar tactic is to place a nuisance charge on the consultation or to place the
date of the interview weeks away. 115 CoNG. Rrc. 2410, 2412 (Jan. 31, 1969). During hear-
ings on the regulation of credit reporting bureaus the following exchange took place:
Mr. (Congressman) Rosenthal: Could you call up and get a copy of my record, if I
have one with your company and let me look at it?
,Mr. Jordan (Credit Data Corporation): No.
Mr. Rosenthal: "No" to which part of the question? No, you couldn't call up, or No,
you don't know if you have it, or No, you couldn't let me see it?
Mr. Jordan: I guess all three.
Hearings, supra note 5, at 72.
13. One of the most powerful incentives to safety by producers and sellers is the
avoidance of a reputation for selling unsafe products. When the harm is concealed, this
incentive is absent. Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects
in Products-An Opposing View, 24 Trt. L. REv. 938, 945 (1957).
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applicant for credit, employment, mortgage, insurance, lease, or loan.
The injury may assume several different forms.
First, misleading or incomplete information may be reported. A bu-
reau may record and report one subscriber's statement that the subject
does not pay his bills or pays them very late. It does not record the
reason, which may be a dispute over defective merchandise, unemploy-
ment, or illness.1 Similarly, credit bureaus cull newspapers and court
records for arrests, liens, lawsuits filed, divorces, indictments, and con-
victions, but do not, in most cases, determine final dispositions of law
suits.15
Second, wholly incorrect information may be reported, as in cases
of mistaken identity.16 In one recent case a credit bureau reported
the plaintiff to have gone bankrupt, to have been subject to various
inquiries into unethical business behavior, and to have been the sub-
ject of an "undesirable loan" report from his bank. All statements were
false, and the source of the mistakes could not be traced.17
Third, defamatory information may be reported. This category neces-
sarily overlaps the last since falsity is an element of defamation, but
not all falsehoods are defamatory.' Many credit reports contain
unverified hearsay, such as a neighbor's views on the subject's marital
relationship, sexual proclivities, drinking or drug-taking habits, and
14. Hearings, supra note 5, at 76.
Mr. (Representative) Rosenthal: Let's suppose a television set that I bought on credit
doesn't work well and I tell them I am not going to pay until the set Is fixed or re-
placed, and I don't pay for 2 or 3 months and we have this dispute going, what hap.
pens to my credit rating?
Mr. Jordan (Credit Data Corporation): If you refuse to pay for the television get, the
subscriber's accounting system, unless he inhibits it, will record the fact that you arc
60 days delinquent. This is a fact of your credit experience.
Mr. Rosenthal: So because of the fact that he sold me a bum television set I can't go
out and get a mortgage and buy a new house?
Mr. Jordan: Whether you can get a mortgage depends on the mortgage lender's In-
terpretation.
Mr. Rosenthal: The mortgage lender from reading your record wouldn't know that I
am a pretty good guy, but there is a dispute over a television set; he would get a
piece of cold information that would have me marked as a delinquent.
Mr. Jordan: He would have the facts which are undeniable that you did not pay
your bill.
15. They do not devote any manpower to the task of obtaining and recording Informa.
tion of dismissed charges, police records expunged due to unjustified arrest, lawsuits
settled out of court or dismissed, indictments quashed or convictions reversed on appeal.
Id. at 10.
16. A New York State assemblyman was recently refused a major credit card due to
an "unfavorable" credit report, based, he discovered after repeated phone calls, visits and
threats of legislative action, on an outstanding judgment against someone of a similar
name. Sesser, How Credit Bureaus Collect and Use Data on Millions of Persons, Wall St.
Journal, Feb. 5, 1968, at 1. What happens to the person without political leverage?
17. Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (19061).
18. W. Paossza, TAE LAw op ToRrs 825 (3rd ed. 1964).
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general reputation.19 Almost any statement of this kind will be defama-
tory if untrue, and many false statements which are significant enough
to lead to denial of credit will be defamatory.2 0
Fourth, a person may be coerced into abandoning his legal rights by
a merchant's threat to harm his credit rating. If a person knows
nothing else about his credit identity, he is aware that a "good credit
rating" is very important. Unscrupulous businessmen are aware of this
too. When a buyer withholds payments on defective merchandise
which the seller refuses to repair or replace, the buyer is exerting his
only leverage. Settlement on the merits is made impossible by the
knowledge, shared by buyer and seller, that there is a third party to
the transaction, the credit reporting bureau, which will receive and
pass on the seller's version. The seller will neither settle nor sue. He
will remind the buyer that his credit rating ill self-destruct if he per-
sists in asserting his position.21 Retailers and others can thus exert
powers exceeding those their economic positions alone could confer.
The credit reporting system encourages and increases overreaching.
Fifth, the harm done by defective reports is exacerbated by the dis-
semination of personal information to a wider audience than the sub-
ject has anticipated or consented to. An applicant for credit or other
financial transaction usually signs an application in which he autho-
rizes the company to investigate his credit record.2 2 But the permission
is strictly pro forma, and user access to the report is unconnected with
the presence or absence of subject consent. Despite industry dis-
claimers 3 evidence exists that credit files can be obtained by nearly
anyone with great ease,24 including police agencies, the Federal Bureau
19. Sesser, Big Brother Keeps Tabs on Insurance Buyers, Tnm Nm'y R,'unuc, Apr. 27,
1968, at 11. Frederick E. King, president of Hooper-Holmes, the largest insurance appli-
cant investigator, describes the procedure. "You go to a neighbor and establish rapport,
... Then you ask, 'What's your opinion of Xs home life; hove do you think of him as a
family man?' This will usually elicit some hint... Then you start digging. You press them
as far as they go, and if they become recalcitrant, you go somewhere else." Id.
20. See pp. 1049-50 infra.
21. See note 14, supra.
22. Hearings, supra note 5, at 28. A common consent form is the following:
I hereby authorize the person to whom this application is made, or any credit bureau,
or any other investigative agency employed by such person, to investigate the
references herein listed, or statements, or other information, oral or written obtained
from me, or any other person pertaining to my credit and financial responsibility..
I hereby release any claims, damages and suits whatsoever which may at any time be
asserted by me by reason of such investigation.
23. Industry spokesmen claim that only "subscriber companies, all of whom are bona
fide credit grantors who have agreed to conditions restricting their access to and use of the
information" may receive reports. "No one else is permitted access for any reason whatso-
ever." Hearings, supra note 5, at 64.
24. The striking disparity between industry doctrine and practical reality was demon-
strated last year by CBS News. According to John Spafford, Executive Director of the
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of Investigation,25 and the Internal Revenue Service, since information
is routinely available to anyone willing to pay the going rate.Y'
Many inquiries do not involve credit and thus raise important issues
of privacy and propriety in access to "confidential" matter by govern-
ment agencies and others who need not show cause to judicial authori-
ties. 27 The potential damage from a mistaken report is drastically in-
creased in these cases, in which a person has no reason to know or be-
lieve he is being investigated, has not given even cursory consent, and
may never know of the damage, let alone its cause.28
Further, the collection and centralization in computers of large
quantities of information with instant and easy access from anywhere
in the country introduces a new parameter to the problem. As centers
of computerized data are linked together on a national and interna-
tional basis, the potential damage and scope of dissemination of
an erroneous report are increased geometrically.29
C. Demand for Credit Reports
The demand side of the credit information market cannot be
described with precision. Nevertheless, several generalizations are pos-
sible.
Associated Credit Bureaus of America, to get a credit report from any of the affiliated
bureaus: (1) the firm must be a bona fide grantor of credit to individual consumers, and
(2) must apply to a local member credit bureau, (3) which will investigate the firm asking
for the report to make sure that it meet the qualifications of (1) above, and (4) will re-
quire the firm to sign a contract with the bureau agreeing to conform to its practices.
CBS invented a bogus firm, a "systems company," and registered it with a company
that provides a mailing address, phone service and printed letterheads to business which
do not wish to rent office space, all for $25. They mailed twenty letters to credit bureaus
in various cities asking for reports on individuals picked at random from those cities'
phone books, claiming that they were considering granting credit to the person Inquired
about. They received without further question ten full reports. Two bureaus offered to
send informaion if a contract were signed. Four didn't reply and only two referred them
to the local bureaus as required by the association rules. Deciding to make it more
difficult, CBS tried one more mailing in which they no longer stated that they were
thinking of granting credit. They wrote for reports on persons who had complained to
congressmen of their troubles with credit bureaus, and between the two mailings, a
tougher set of code regulations had gone into effect. Of twenty.eight letters sent, they
received seven reports, twelve referrals to local bureaus, one flat refusal, three offers of
contracts, and five did not respond. They signed one of the contracts and received a full
report within a few days.
25. F.E. King, President of Hooper-Holmes Bureau, which maintains files on over 54
million insurance applicants, states, "The FBI can do just about anything they want to.
They're constantly in our files." Sesser, supra note 19.
26. Black, supra note 6, at 36.
27. See generally, Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a
Remedy, 57 GEo. L.J. 509 (1969).
28. The problem is not limited to governmental agencies pursuing their own objec-
tives. Private detective agencies, marketing research firms, litigants screening jurors for
voir dire, country clubs, even fiancees, consult credit bureaus.
29. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology
in an Information Oriented Society, 67 MicH. L. Rav. 1091 (1969).
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Information is indispensable for credit decisions. In an impersonal
and highly mobile society, risk reduction requires the fullest possible
knowledge of the prospective debtor's solvency. Virtually every
creditor obtains information from the applicant and checks it. In the
normal transaction, the creditor checks with a creditor reporting
bureau.30
There is no satisfactory, economical substitute for a credit bureau
report. The creditor can: (1) do nothing, relying on the application;
(2) undertake an investigation on its own; (3) hire a private investi-
gator; or (4) buy a credit report. The first alternative involves an
unacceptable level of risk.31 The second would result in high adminis-
trative expenses which even the largest corporations are normally
unwilling to undertake.3 2 Private detective services are extremely ex-
pensive relative to credit reports.
Thus, most creditors rely exclusively on credit reports for pre-de-
cision information. Since independent investigations of applicants
are expensive and the risk of acting without outside information is
high, most creditors will reject the applicant on whom the credit
bureaus with which they deal have no report.33
The danger has been limited in the past for several reasons. (1) Large quantities of
information about individuals have not been collected and therefore have not been
available; (2) the available information generally has been maintained on a decentralized
basis; (3) the available information has been relatively superficial in character and often
has been allowed to atrophy to the point of uselessness; (4) the available information was
difficult to keep track of, and (5) most people are unable to interpret and inter revealing
information from the available data. Id. at 1108. The translation of raw data from
alphabetic notation to the appropriate computer format introduces one new processing stage
susceptible to human error. Clerical error in data processing can be extremely damaging.
With data retrieval cheap and storage expensive, computer programming is likely to be rigid
and highly categorized, with spectral categories of conclusory terms, (good, fair, poor, etc.)
which would have even less breadth than the incomplete report of the paper file. Informa-
tion stored far from the point of original recording and employed for purposes different
from those for which it was collected will cause difficult evaluative problems. Another diffi-
culty is the human response to computer data. It is considered to have a higher degree of
probity than data reported by a person. The facts which emerge from the computer tend
to become the only significant facts on the subject. Evaluative decisions on the basis of raw
data will probably be turned over to computers on a formula basis, further reducing the
flexibility of dedsion-making and the likelihood that explanatory matter will accompany
soft data. The expensive operation of computers dictates time sharing. thus data may be-
come accessible to others than the bureau since security techniques by the computer indus-
try are minimal. The centralization of formerly decentralized stores of information will
mean that one invasion will secure for the intruder vast quantities of data that formerly
could be obtained only by many penetrations. Thus, there are unaccounted-for costs in the
cost-saving economics of computerization.
30. See, e.g., p. 1053 infra.
31. The occasional exception for whom this level of risk is acceptable is the ghetto
merchant who may prefer coercive collection practices to detailed pre-credit screening.
An increased price of credit reports could lead to a shift toward more coercive collection.
Thus, the demand for credit reports is relatively, not completely, inelastic. See LeIt,
Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamic of Coercive Collection 80 YA.E .J. 1 (1970).
82. The Bank of America is a good example. It discontinued investigations and hired
Credit Data Corporation to do the job. Hearings, supra note 5, at 83-84.
33. Conversations with officers of the Security National Bank, Oakland, California,
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Given the need for credit information, the lack of adequate substi-
tutes for the credit report, and the heavy reliance upon credit report-
ing bureaus, the following assumption, used throughout this Note, is
made: The demand for credit reports is relatively inelastic, and thus
the number of credit reports purchased will be somewhat insensitive
to price changes. Although a rise in the price would lead to some re-
duction in the number of credit reports purchased, total dollar sales
would rise.3'
II. Putting the Burden on the Bureaus
The cost to society of credit reporting accidents is high. In evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of laws which apply to credit reporting bureaus,
the basic issue is which liability rules will minimize the total cost to
society of credit reporting accidents. Two questions are critical: (1)
Which party is the cheapest cost avoider, i.e. should bear the cost of
accidents? (2) What mix of judicial and legislative rules achieves the
lowest cost?
In The Cost of Accidents,35 Professor Calabresi provides a frame-
work for answering these questions. He divides the cost of accidents
into several categories. "Primary" accident costs measure the direct
loss to accident "participants," such as loss of earnings, damage to
property, and out-of-pocket expenses, 0 and the costs of avoiding ac-
cidents. Primary costs should be borne by the "cheapest cost avoider,"O
the party which can best assign the costs to the harm-causing activity,
predict them most accurately, and insure against them at the lowest
cost. "Secondary" costs are the avoidable social costs of accidents-loss
of economic position and social status, alienation and emotional suffer-
ing-caused when large losses fall on the individual victims.38 The
level of secondary costs is inversely related to the degree of cost spread-
ing, among people and over time.39 "Tertiary" costs are the costs of
administering legal rules, either through judicial machinery or an ad-
ministrative counterpart. 40 Because the types of cost are interrelated,
August 15, 1969, and Manager, Smolen's Furniture, New Haven, Connecticut, September
20, 1970.
34. For an excellent introductory discussion of the concept of elasticity of demand,
see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICs, 363-67 (7th ed. 1967).
35. G. CALARESz, Tsn Costs OF AccIDENTs, A LEGAL AND EcoNouc ANALYSiS (1970).
36. Id. at 26-27.
37. Id. at 143-73.
38. Id. at 27-28.
39. Id. at 39-40.
40. Id. at 28-29.
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one object of liability rules is to minimize the net sum of primary,
secondary and tertiary costs.4'
Primary cost reduction may be attempted through one or a combina-
tion of two approaches. The "general deterrence" or "market"
method, working through judicial rules, places on economic activities
the cost of the accidents they cause. The impact of this deterrent is felt
in market transactions, and financial incentives to reduce the risk
of the activity are thereby created. Businesses will institute safeguards
to make their activities safer, up to the point where it becomes cheaper
to buy liability insurance.43 "Specific deterrence," or the "collective"
method," proscribes or restricts the harm-causing activity directly by
legislation rather than working through the market. When a harm-
causing activity is also socially useful, as is credit reporting, limitation
rather than prohibition is appropriate. 45 At this point, the question is
which party, the bureau or the subject, is the cheapest cost avoider, and
as such, should bear the primary costs.
According to a prominent economic theory40 the choice of primary
cost bearer will have no effect on the "real" price of the product. If this
theory were correct in practice there could be no general deterrence,
or primary cost reduction, in shifting cost from the victim to the
producer. This theory reasons that if a seller of a product is liable for
the injuries he causes, the cost of his safeguards and insurance raises
the price of the product. If the user or consumer bears the cost, he will
insure against accidents, and the cost of the product will be that much
lower. The total price of the product plus insurance would in theory
be the same either way.
In reality, however, there are several reasons why it makes a differ-
ence who bears the primary cost, reasons which suggest the bureaus
should be primary cost bearers. Saying it makes no difference
presupposes an all knowing, all rational economic world which
does not exist. In the first place, even if such a world did exist,
some risks would still be assignable to the activity which caused
them by only one party.47
Thus, the credit report's subject, even if he considered buying defama-
41. See p. 1054 infra.
42. G. CAAs supra note 35, at 68-94.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 95-129.
45. Id. at 68-69.
46. Id. at 162.
47. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Rislk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 449, 506 (1961).
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tion insurance because of the risk of being defamed, would not be
able to make this cost part of the price of credit reports because he
doesn't buy the reports. Report buyers, who wouldn't need or buy the
insurance since they are not the ones endangered, would buy just as
many reports, even though their purchases raised the cost of defama-
tion insurance to the subjects. Thus, as between bureau and subject,
the bureau is the only party which can assign the cost of accidents to
the price of the reports. Therefore, to reduce primary cost, the cost of
accidents should be imposed on the bureaus.
Next,
one of the two parties may, in practice, be far more able than the
other to evaluate the accident risk, i.e. the expected accident
costs. And if this is the case, his activity is better suited (in terms
of deterrence of accident prone activities) to bear the initial loss.'"
It is a fair assumption that credit reporting bureaus know more ac-
curately the expected cost of using the reports than do the subjects of
the reports. Since the bureaus are better able to evaluate the risks, they
are better able to find the best mix of safeguards and insurance. Im-
posing the primary cost on them will force them to do so.
40
A third reason why it matters who bears the primary cost is that
it may not cost the two parties the same amount to insure against
the loss. If the loss is placed on the party for whom insurance is
less available or more expensive, a false cost-the excess cost of his
insuring-will in effect be made a part of the price of the goods5 0
Liability insurance is common, and routinely available in the com-
mercial world. 1 It would probably be cheaper and easier for bureaus
to insure than it would be for all potential credit report subjects to
do SO.2
The credit reporting bureau is thus able to assign the cost which
the subject cannot, to evaluate the costs more accurately than the sub-
ject can, and to insure against them at lower cost. The bureau would
48. G. C.ABREsi, supra note 35, at 163.
49. There would be a few situations in which the subject would be better able to
evaluate the risk and therefore be the cheapest cost avoider. This would be the super-
sensitive person for whom a mistaken report would be a critical trauma, and the person
for whom the particular transaction is his only opportunity of that kind. These are
rare situations, however, and a choice of cheapest cost avoider depends on a general
validity which may not be correct in some individual situations, but which usually will
be.
50. G. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 164.
51. See DENENBERG, RISK AND INSURANCE (1964) 364-75.
52. If insurance against the risk of defamation were available, the transaction costs
involved in requiring every potential subject to insure would be astronomical, Tratis.
action costs would be much lower if bureaus do the insuring.
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be the cheapest avoider of primary costs, and imposing the cost on it
would achieve the best general deterrence.
Imposing liability on credit bureaus would also reduce the secondary
costs of reporting accidents. It has been contended that losses are least
disruptive to society, socially and economically, when they are spread
widely among people and over time. 3 Thus, taking one dollar from
each of 10,000 people-interpersonal loss spreading--causes less dis-
location than taking $10,000 from one person. Similarly, the benefit
of intertemporal loss spreading is that spreading losses over time is
less harmful than imposing the whole burden when the loss occurs.
Though the widest loss spreading would be achieved through social
insurance, enterprise liability is preferable because it works through
the market and reduces primary cost.5"
Holding credit reporting bureaus liable for their accidents would
achieve wide loss spreading. The cost of safeguards and insurance
would become part of the price of reports. Assuming relatively inelastic
demand for credit reports,55 the cost would be passed on to report
buyers. They would make the increased cost part of the price of credit,
and each consumer of credit would pay a small part of the cost.60 Loss
would thus be spread from individual victims to all potential victims.
Insofar as the cost of mistakes cannot be passed on by the bureaus,
they should absorb them because they are financially better able to
do so than are the victims. 7 This is the "deep pocket"-3 aproach to
risk spreading, based on the view that when the party with the deep
pocket must absorb part of the cost, society's secondary costs are lower
than they would be if the party with the shallower one absorbed it. As
a general rule, the commercial enterprise has a deeper pocket than
the person its activities harm. 9
53. Id. at 39-45.
54. Id. at 54.
55. See p. 1042, supra, pp. 1053-54 infra.
56. The degree to which credit grantors can pass on increased costs of operation de-
pends on the elasticity of demand for their products. The allocation of costs, however, is
also an accounting concept. Increased cost of credit reports, as a matter of internal cost
accounting, is likely to be allocated to the credit operation. Since the charge for consumer
credit often is more related to the maximum charge allowed legally than to the cost of a
credit operation, the extent to which increased costs will be absorbed or passed on is uin-
clear. Credit offered by retail stores and finance companies normally costs the legal
maximum. This is not true for commercial banks.
57. Although this is probably untrue on occasion, it is the assumption which underlies
other areas of the law-products liability for example. As a general matter the enterprise
is assumed to have a deeper pocket than the individual customer or user. The deep
pocket approach is more applicable in theory than in practice as it applies to credit
reporting bureaus, however, if the demand for reports is inelastic. Sec pp. 1053.54 infra.
58. G. CALABR~mRs, supra note 85, at 40.
59. One further aspect of secondary cost is the dislocation which would result if the
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If liability were placed on credit reporting bureaus, tertiary, or
administrative, cost would rise due to a trade-off with primary and
secondary costs. In a system where injured parties have no cause of
action, there are virtually no administrative costs, although primary
and secondary costs will be very high. A good scheme for reducing the
latter, such as enterprise liability, will be more expensive administra-
tively than other schemes, but it reduces primary and secondary costs
very effectively. Further, any liability structure which depends on a
case-by-case determination with judge and jury is expensive to ad.
minister.60 Enterprise liability is cheaper than a fault system because
reasonable care issues are removed from the case. Ultimately, as Gala-
bresi points out,61 once one chooses a cost avoidance system, administra.
tive costs become primary costs and cannot be analyzed separately. The
choice of a system must be based on a rough guess of who is the
cheapest cost avoider and what system best reduces total accident costs.
As noted, in this case it appears to be the enterprise, the credit re-
porting bureau. As the locus of the two critical processes, information
collection and dissemination, and money collection and expenditure,
the bureau is ideally suited to evaluate and reduce the risk of injury,
as well as spread the cost of injuries. In sum, if efficient primary,
secondary and tertiary cost reduction were the sole criterion in struc.
turing regulations, liability for credit reporting injuries arguably
ought to be placed on the bureau.
It may be that this rough guess is incorrect, because costing out
judicial changes is difficult and imprecise. Thus, it may be that a
system which seeks to prevent, reduce, and compensate for injury to
innocent persons costs society more than one which doesn't bother.
But cost is not the only criterion-liability rules must also be fair.
In torts, fairness involves compensating relatively innocent victims
by making relatively wrong-doing harm-causersG2 pay or allocate the
costs.0 Fairness also requires a reasonable and convenient process for
adjudicating claims. In credit reporting, however, innocent persons
increase in cost to the bureau or its customers causes firms to go out of business, While
this is a potential problem, inelasticity of demand suggests it is a rather small one. Further,
a basic premise of a free enterprise market economy is that inefficient busineses should
go out of business. Only when this happens will the forces of supply and demand achieve
the most efficient overall allocation of resources.
60. G. CAL"RES, supra note 35, at 251.
61. Conversation with Professor Calabresi, March 16, 1971.
62. There may be a contradiction in saying that an act which is not preventable by
exercising due care is an act of "wrong-doing." The term simply means that as between
the parties, though both be "innocent," the party who causes the injury in fact Is a
"wrong-doer" relative to the victim who played no part in causing the injury,
63. G. CALAunsi, supra note 35, at 302-05.
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who are falsely characterized, defamed, improperly exposed, or coerced04
have no recourse against credit bureaus whose sole motive in knowingly
exposing persons to risk of harm is profit. Enterprise liability would
correct this inequity. Further, it is unfair if tortfeasors can, by secrecy
or concealment, avoid responsibility for the harm they do. Yet, due to
insufficient regulation, credit bureaus are able to do so.
III. Arguments for the Status Quo
Arguments for making the liability rules more fair gain even more
force when the gross inadequacy of the bureaus' justifications for
present practices is considered
Discussions of the harm done to individuals by credit reporting
bureaus generally conclude that the harm done is very little in com-
parison with the benefit received, and that relatively few persons are
injured by false reports6 5 Such statements are not based on empirical
evidence and are self-serving. No one can ascertain how many persons
are harmed by faulty or improperly released reports because secrecy by
grantors and bureaus prevents subjects from learning when a credit
report has harmed them or whether the report is erroneous.
But given the lack of evidence to support the bureaus' claims and
the demonstrated difficulty of discovering mistakes, this Note proceeds
on the assumption that the people who have discovered the source of
their injury are the tip of the iceberg, with a much larger portion
below."
One justification advanced by credit reporting bureaus for their
secrecy is the claim that allowing the consumer to see his file would dry
up sources of information. For example, stores may not be willing to
turn their credit records over to the bureau if their customers will find
out that the store reported them as "slow pay." The store still wants
their business and doesn't want to offend.
This argument is specious. Creditors rely on the exchange of in-
formation among themselves, via the credit report, to reduce the risk
in credit decisions. Their continued need for credit information and
the gain obtained therefrom will, if the assumption that demand for
reports is inelastic is correct,67 outweigh the loss of patronage from of-
64. See pp. 1038-1040 supra.
65. See, e.g., Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies, 14 CoLUmn. I- Rzv.
187, 207, 296 (1914).
66. See p. 1037 supra.
67. See pp. 1041-42 supra, pp. 1053-54 infro.
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fended customers. Assuming, further, that all stores of a particular
type use credit reports, consumers seeking credit could not choose one
store over another because one reports the transaction and the other
does not.
Moreover, as noted, this secrecy allows credit bureaus to avoid
responsibility for the harm they do by hiding the harm, and prevents
correction before more harm is done. Even if it were true that opening
the system caused some reduction in the quantity of information
compiled, credit grantors should not be allowed to work both sides of
the street. If credit grantors wish and need to exchange information on
their customers they should do it openly, alerting their customers to
the danger of late payment, and offering them the opportunity to
participate in the credit granting process.
A second justification for current practices is that the self-interest of
credit bureaus will assure the accuracy of credit reports. If the reports
aren't accurate, those who buy them will get their information else-
where.
Although bureaus and their customers do have an economic interest
in the validity of information this does not assure care and accuracy.
In a system with no feedback, sales are lost due to false negative re-
ports. But these losses are hidden from the potential buyer who, thus,
cannot bring errors to the seller's attention. Credit grantors have no
incentive to go elsewhere when they are unaware of reports that err
against the consumer. Since the object of credit reports is to weed out
bad risks, false positive reports,6 s in which the bureau has failed to dis-
cover the detrimental truth, are probably less frequent than negative
mistakes. When positive mistakes lead to losses they may be attributed
to random error or misevaluation of data. Even if error were suspected,
a demand for greater accuracy would mean more intensive pursuit of
negative information, not greater efforts toward balance, objectivity,
accuracy and overall fairness. Such a shift toward "greater objectivity"
would just increase the number of negative mistakes.
Nevertheless, mistakes are harmful to the credit grantor, the appli-
cant and other borrowers. 9 They currently go undiscovered. An open
68. The mistakes considered here are those in which credit bureaus fail to alert the
credit grantor to risk factors upon which the grantor would have decided not to grant
credit if those factors had been brought to its attention. These are not the mistakes with
which this Note is primarily concerned, but they are relevant insofar as their discovery
affects the accuracy of the reporting process.
69. Good credit customers are also injured by false positive reports. The cost of credit
is higher because they are required to subsidize bad credit risks who get credit when
they should not.
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system would bring errors to the surface, to the benefit of all parties.
Only then will grantors be able to choose among credit bureaus on the
basis of accuracy and reliability.
IV. Judicial Aspects
In previous sections, this Note has contended that liability for credit
reporting accidents ought to be placed on the credit bureau because it
is the cheapest cost avoider. In this section, defamation and products
liability will be considered as alternative means of effecting general
deterrence.
A. Defamation
An action in defamation seeks to redress one large group of injuries
credit report subjects suffer.7 0 It would not reach other types of harm.
Defamation is a tort of strict liability once the expression is shown to
be defamatory in nature.7' It is, in theory, a tort based on malice, but
the malice is presumed to have existed from the publication of a false
and damaging statement and is constructive, not actual. In general, to
be defamatory a statement must tend so to harm one's reputation as to
"lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third per-
sons from associating or dealing with him." 72 Normally, if slander does
not impute to its subject crime, loathsome disease, incompetence at
his trade, or unchastity, then specific economic damages must be shown.
No such proof, however, is required in libel cases, 7 and since a credit
report is usually written or read from a written statement, it would
usually be a libel."t
It is defamatory to report falsely that plaintiff refuses to pay his
debts,7 that he has been indicted or is under indictment,70 that he was
fired,77 dishonest,7 8 a drunk,79 that he was engaged in immoral
activity,80 or was having marital trouble,st or went bankrupt.s2 These
70. See pp. 1038-39 supra.
71. See W. PxossER, supra note 18, at 791.
72. 3 RETATEMENT OF ToRTs § 559 (1938).
73. See W. Pfossm,.supra note 18, at 773.
74. Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 337, 47 N.E.2d 595 (1943); Ohio
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Myers, 54 Ohio App. 40, 6 N.E2.d 29 (1934).
75. Sheppard v. Dun & Bradstreet, 71 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
76. Rudawsky v. Northwestern Jobbers Credit Bureau, 183 Minn. 21, 235 N.W. 523
(1931).
77. Gartman v. Hedgpeth, 138 Tet. 73, 157 S.A.2d 139 (1941).
78. Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438, 2 P.2d 383 (1931).
79. McKee v. Robert, 197 App. Div. 842, 189 N.Y.S. 502 (1921).
80. More v. Bennett, 48 N.Y. 472 (1872).
81. Lyman v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co. 286 Mass. 258, 190 N.E. 542 (1934).
82. Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc. 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376 (1961).
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are the kind of statements in credit reports that lead to rejection of an
application to enter financial transactions.
However, as an approach to recovery for damage from an erroneous
credit report, defamation has been unavailing. Defending against
charges of defamation, credit reporters can raise "conditional
privilege" as an affirmative defense. Credit bureaus have the condi-
tional privilege to defame the persons they report on, and bureaus are
liable for defamation only if the plaintiff can prove the defamatory
statement was motivated by actual malice.8s
Conditional privilege is a defense of judicial origin which arose to
protect from otherwise strict liability defendants whose statements,
made from a sense of legal or moral duty, turn out to be defamatory.84
Where courts find that prevailing community moral standards compel
an honest man to speak, the conditional privilege protects the speaker
from liability if the comment is defamatory. Among those thought to
have a moral obligation to speak was the person asked about the sol-
vency of another by a potential creditor.
Although England 5 refused to extend the privilege to credit report-
ing bureaus, early American cases were divided on the point.8 0 But
now, every state which has considered the question except Idaho and
Georgia has extended the conditional privilege to credit reporting
bureaus8 7 and requires a plaintiff to prove actual malice on the part
83. The privilege may be lost for reasons other than malice which are not relevant to
this Note. They include publication to one whose interest in the information Is not
legally protected, excessive publication, publication of the matter for some improper
purpose, or publication of defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be neceassry
for the purpose for which the occasion is privileged. See, generally, Hallen Excessive
Publication in Defamation, 16 MINN. L. RLy. 160 (1932); Hallen, Character of Belief
Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 Il. L. REV. 865 (1931).
84. The doctrine is applied, for example, when a person informs law enforcement au-
thorities that another has engaged in illegal activity. Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines,
189 F.2d 537 (2d. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 US. 871; when lawyers speak to protect the
interests of their clients; Krause v. Rabe, 80 N.J.L. 378 (1910).
85. Macintosh v. Dun, [1908] A.C. 390 (P.C.).
86. No Privilege
Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886)
Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696 (1914)
Privilege
Trussel v. Scarlet, 18 F. 214 (CC Md. 1882)
Erber v. Dun, 12 F. 526, 4 McCrary 160 (1882)
King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 9 A. 705 (1887)
Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868)
Crist v. Bradstreet, 9 Ohio St. Rep. 751 (1886)
87. In addition to those jurisdictions listed in note 86 supra, the following jurisdictions
have extended the conditional privilege to credit bureaus:
Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 62 Cal. 412, 398 P. 2d 785, 42 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1905);
Melcher v. Beeler, 48 Colo. 233, 110 P. 181 (1919); Watwood v. Stores Mercantile Agency,
Inc., 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Hooper-Holmes Bureau v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.
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of the bureau in order to recover.88 This has generally prevented re-
covery against credit bureaus for false and defamatory reports, since
express intent to harm is rarely involved.
1947) (FLa. law applied); Putnal v. Inman, 76 Fla. 553, 80 So. 316 (1918); Ideal Motor Co.
v. Warfield, 211 Ky. 576, 277 S.W. 862 (1925); Toothaker v. Conant, 91 Me. 438, 40 A. 331
(1898); Hanschke v. Merchant's Credit Bureau, 256 Mich. 272, 239 NA.. 318 (1931); Lowry
v. Vedder, 40 Minn. 475, 42 N.W. 542 (1889); Retail Credit Co. v. Garraway, 240 Miss. 230,
126 So. 2d 271 (1961); Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 226, 22 S.V. 358 (1893); Bartels
v. Retail Credit Co., 175 N.W.2d 292 (Neb. Sup. Ct. 1970); H.E. Crawford Co. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1957) (N.C. law applied); Pomeroy v. Dun & Bradstreet,
146 F. Supp. 59 (D. Ore. 1956); Hartman & Co. v. Hyman, 287 Pa. 78, 134 A. 486 (1926);
Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955); Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet,
172 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1949) (Tenn. law applied); The Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. I15,
9 S.W. 753 (1888); Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 86 P. 1063 (1906). Contra, Denney
v. Northwestern Credit Assn., 55 Wash. 769 (1909) (dictum); Barker v. Retail Credit Co.,
8 Wis. 2d 664, 100 N.W.2d 391 (1960).
In states where the only law on the subject is dictum, there is often analoous case law
in other privilege cases which would make the extension to credit bureaus likely if that
were the exact point of the case. Of course, in jurisdictions willing to reconsider the
question, the absence of any holding would make reversal easier. There may also be room
for distinguishing "mutual protective credit associations" from credit reporting bureaus
in some jurisdictions.
88. The harshness of granting the conditional privilege to credit bureaus has oc-
casionally been noted. See 2 DE PAUL L. REV. 69 (1952); 31 Tnxr. L.Q. 50 (1957); 86 N.
DA. L. REv. 201 (1960).Some jurisdictions have recognized the hardship created by the prvilege and have at.
tempted to ameliorate it. It has been held that the conditional privilege may be destroyed
by actual or expressed malice, excessive publication, absence of good faith shown by reck-
lessness, or absence of reasonable grounds to believe in the truth of the report, upon
which the jury may find bad faith. Melcher v. Beeer, 48 Colo. 233, 110 P. 181 (1919);
Ely v. Mason, 97 Cann. 38, 115 A. 479 (1921); Rowland v. Blake Co., 156 Mass. 543, 31
N.E. 656 (1892); Polasky v. Minchener, 81 Much. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Hanschke v. Mer-
chant's Credit Bureau, 256 lfich. 272. 239 N.W. 318 (1931); Hemmens v. Nelson, 13 N.Y.
517, 34 N.E. 342 (1893); Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional
Privilege in Defamation, 25 IL. L. REv. 865 (1931). "Mere negligence," however, will not
defeat the privilege. In re Retailers Commercial Agency, 342 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 376
(1961). The meaning of "mere negligence" divorced from absence of reasonable grounds
to believe is elusive, for the reasonable man test is a negligence standard.
Other courts have held that malice may be proved by showing recklesess, equivalent
to a lack of concern with whether the facts are true or not. ABC Needlecraft Co. v. Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc., 245 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1957); Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 14 (1858); Gott
v. Pulsifer 122 Mass. 235 (1877). Inconsistencies remain. One court held that malice may
be shown by proving that defendant "had not made reasonable inquiry and investigation,
but had written recklessly .... Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285, 289, 86 P. 627, 628
(1906). Is not the absence of reasonable inquiry a negligence standard?
There is growing recognition that malice is a meaningless term in this context and
should be abandoned altogether. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 822. "The meaning of
the word in this context is nothing more than that the publication was made without
legal justification." I F. HARPE & F. JAms, THE LAw oF Toars, 451 (1956). Some courts
which decided to protect credit bureaus on policy grounds have done so by holding that
if the bureau had exercised reasonable care to assure the accuracy and accurate trans.
mission of information received, it could then assert the conditional privilege. Baskett v.
Crossfield, 190 Ky. 751, 288 S.V. 673 (1920); Toothaker v. Conant, 91 Me. 433, 40 A. 331
(1898); Carpenter v. Bailey, 53 N.H. 590 (1873); Montgomery v. Dennison, S63 Pa. 255,
69 A.2d 520 (1949). This is the position of the REsTATEMNT oF ToRTs, supra note 72, at
§ 594, -which would hold the occasion abused and the protection of the privilege lost
by the publisher's lack of belief or reasonable grounds for belief In the truth of the
defamatory matter. Id. § 605. The negligence test is the first step toward reality. "There
is a widespread and legitimate fear of overcentralizing individual information and then
increasing the number of people who, by having access to it, have the capacity to Inflict
damage through negligence, sheer stupidity, or a lack of EensitivIty to the value of
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The first comprehensive policy statement justifying extension of
the privilege to credit bureaus is a 1914 law review article by Jeremiah
Smith.s9 Written to rebut the English decision, Macintosh v. Dun,90 it
helped crystalize the "American Rule" and it remains to date the most
articulate statement in support of that rule.
If such communications are not protected by the law from the
danger of vexatious litigation in cases where they turn out to be
incorrect in fact, the stability of men engaged in trade and com-
merce would be exposed to the greatest hazard, for no man would
answer an inquiry as to the solvency of another.... [G]an it be
desirable to impose conditions of immunity so stringent as to dis-
courage the giving of information and thus diminish materially
the probability that the desired information will be obtained by
persons in need of it?
Protection of the individual must give way, in this view, to the interests
of the business community. Smith asserted that credit information is
personal privacy. Unthinking people are as capable of injuring others by unintentionally
rendering a record inaccurate, losing it or disseminating its contents to unauthorized
users as are people acting out of malice or for personal aggrandizement. It is simply
unrealistic to expect subtle standards of care and basic principles of individual privacy to
be consistently understood or implemented by people in clerical positions." Miller, supra
note 29, at 1114.
The doctrinal confusion is far from over. The most recent case on the subject was
one of first impression in Nebraska, Bartels v. Retail Credit Co., 175 N.W.2d 292 (1970).
After adopting as law the rule that
[a] publication loses its character as privileged and is actionable if it is motivated
by express or actual malice or if there is such a gross disregard of the rights of the
person injured as is equivalent to malice in fact
the court contradicted itself. Credit bureaus, it stated, must use "reasonable care to as-
certain the facts," and a "thorough and complete investigation is required" in order to
meet its obligation. If this isn't a negligence test, what is?
Nevertheless, if negligence were uniformly held to defeat the privilege there would still
be an enormous evidentiary problem. Just as proving the negligence of a giant manufac,
turer was once an insuperable obstacle to recovery for injury due to defective products, the
proof of negligence by a large, computerized information supplier would be nearly Im-
possible. A presumption of negligence or the application of res ipsa loquitur would be
necessary to make recovery a meaningful possibility. A statement in a credit record that
a person, whose business has always been solvent, has gone into bankruptcy every seven
years since the Federal Bankruptcy Act was enacted would be false and damaging, the
result of carelessness, but there may be no evidence at all concerning how that entry got
into the file. If negligence may not be inferred from the error itself, recovery would
usually not be possible since the plaintiff could not satisfy the production burden,
89. Smith, supra note 65. Smith's article remains the only substantial treatment of
this subject in legal scholarship. It synthesized previous cases on the subject and provided
the original legal and economic justification for the present rule. Prosser cites the article
several times in support of his exposition and approval of the rule. W. Pnosstm, suipra
note 18, at 805 n.71, 810 n.25. As recently as 1961, the Massachusetts supreme court in
a case of first impression, referred with approval to Smith's article in holding that credit
bureaus are conditionally privileged. Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc., 3,12
Mass. 515, 520, 174 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1961). The language used is nearly identical to Smith's.
"Without such protection few would undertake to furnish information and the cost
would be high, if not prohibitive."
90. [1908] A.C. 390 (P.C.).
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so important to the community that its flow must not be impeded by
allowing innocent persons defamed in the process to gain judicial re-
lief.91 Smith also argued against denying the conditional privilege be-
cause of the bureau's profit motive.92 He reasoned that profit is not
relevant because it is the interest of the recipient of the information,
not the method of furnishing it, which the conditional privilege is
intended to protect.9 3
In short, Smith contended that if the conditional privilege were not
extended, credit bureaus would go out of business due to the cost of
defamation suits. This contention is based on the assumption that the
demand for credit reports is very elastic, and that a small rise in the
cost of reports would cause a large reduction in the quantity of reports
purchased and in total dollar sales. This assumption of high elasticity
of demand for credit reports is susceptible to very simple, if very crude,
empirical verification. If Smith were correct, credit bureaus would not
exist in jurisdictions where the privilege is denied. Despite the denial
of the privilege in GeorgiaP Atlanta has more than 20 "credit report-
ing agencies" including Dun and Bradstreet, a local member of the
Associated Credit Bureaus of America, and one of the largest national
companies in the field, Retail Credit Corporation.5 A recent study0
of credit practices among retail furniture and appliance dealers in
Boise, Idaho, and Spokane, Washington, suggests the same conclusion.
Idaho denies the privilege, Washington extends it.07 All dealers studied
in both cities offer credit to their customers, both on open account and
installment, and the median percentage of credit sales to gross sales
approaches 80% in each city. All banks and finance companies, which
carried most of the commercial paper, had extensive information on
the borrower, obtained at the time of the loan.
The aggregate of both banks and finance companies showed that
approximately 77% of the borrowers had been checked with a
credit bureau.98
91. "The real test is whether the harm likely to be done to applicants for credit by
mistaken statements of an unfavorable nature, bears so large a proportion to the benefits
or advantages likely to be derived by subscribers .. . through the mercantile agency
reports, as to render it inexpedient or unjust for the law to afford prima facie immunity
to the party making the reports." Smith, supra note 65, at 207.
92. Id. at 297.
93. Id.
94. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886).
95. SourHm~ B. TELEPHONE Co., Y-LLOW PAGES 312 (Dec. 1969).
96. UNIvEWT OF IDAHO, CREDrr PRAcncEs oF RrA mLS AND FINANCERS OF FmnnNTRE
ANDHomm Ap.PwAcEs m Two NORTmvEST Crrs, (1963) [hereinafter cited as CrEmrr
PRAcTMCES.
97. See notes 86 & 87, supra.
98. CREDrr PRAcrIcEs, supra note 96, at 43.
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In short, credit granting and investigating practices were found to
be nearly identical in two large cities, one with conditional privilege
and one without.99
These statistics do not prove, or even assume, that the price or
quality of credit reports is identical in places with and without the
privilege. But they do demonstrate that even though the privilege is
denied, many credit bureaus can be sustained by the market, and
creditors continue to get information they require, in most cases from
credit reporting bureaus.
In Calabresi's terms, Smith's erroneous assumption is that there
could be no general deterrence and that denying the privilege would
be a proscription of credit reporting altogether. Because of this error,
Smith's article begs the basic question: How should the risk of credit
reporting accidents be allocated?
Obviously, in jurisdictions where the privilege is extended, the risk
and costs of loss fall on the injured persons; where there is no privilege
the credit bureau bears the risk and cost of the damage it does. With-
out the conditional privilege, normal defamation doctrine would
govern. Credit bureaus would be liable, without regard to intent or
fault, for the damage defamatory reports do. Strict liability of the
enterprise is desirable, 0 0 for it would encourage safety precautions,
spread losses more widely, and would arguably be more fair.01
B. Products Liability
Accident avoidance, risk spreading and fairness are also the policies
behind products liability law. As another form of enterprise liability,
this is a promising alternative to defamation because an additional
class of injuries could be covered. Not all damaging inaccuracies are
defamatory. Any report containing a material error, omission or im-
plication which could reasonably be found to have created a false im-
pression of the subject's conduct or character, and to have injured the
subject, would arguably be "defective" and present a case in products
liability.
Most courts find products liability 0 2 by recognizing a cause of action
99. Credit is growing rapidly in England, also, where the conditional privilege has
never been extended to credit bureaus. In 1964, almost $3 billion in installment sales
were made, on the basis of credit information supplied primarily by banks. Literature
discussing the growth of credit in England does not indicate whether or not there are
American-type credit reporting bureaus there, but in any case, creditors get the Informa-
tion. BomUE & DIAMOND, Tim CONSUMER, SOCi=-rY AND THE LAw, 157 (2d ed. 1964).
100. See pp. 1042-46 supra.
101. See pp. 1046-47 supra.
102. For a good analysis of the origins and implications of products liability as
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for strict liability in tort10 3 or for breach of implied warranty.104
Neither action requires a showing of contractual privity or manufac-
turer's negligence. 05 In order to recover for a defective credit report
under products liability theory, proof of three common elements
would be required: a defective product, which causes personal or prop-
erty injury, to a user or consumer. Two additional elements must also
be considered: whether one may recover for purely economic loss in
strict tort liability, and whether an implied warranty may be dis-
claimed by the manufacturer.
The coverage of products liability has spread rapidly.100 Beginning
sui generis, part contract, part tort, see Left, Contract as Thing 19 AIL U.L. REV. 131
(1970).
103. IV. PRossEP, supra note 18, at 672-78.
104. Id. at 678-81.
105. Lack of privity has been no bar to a negligence action since MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1051 (1916). Among the first of many cases to
eliminate the requirement of privity in strict liability suits was Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); See Pr sser, The
Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE Uj. 1099 (1960).
Though privity of contract is not required for recovery under implied warranty, the
scope of protection varies widely. Most states have adopted one of the three alternative
forms of § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Section 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied.
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
is in the fEamily or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude
or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person uho
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who
is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the oods and who is
injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the
warranty extends.
Other states have adopted amended versions of one of the alternatives, while the rest
have rejected all three and left the pre-existing case law in effect.
In the strict liability in tort area, RESrATEmENT (SEcoND) oF Toms § 402A (1965) is
much more expansive:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for ph)ical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relations with the seller.
106. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 50 Mto'.
L REv., 791, 793-97 (1966).
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with food, it has been extended to products for intimate bodily use.
The expansion has continued to the point that the seller of "any
(defective) product" may be held strictly liable.107 Despite these sweep-
ing statements, the outlines of products liability are imprecise because
a comprehensive judicial definition of "product" is lacking. The im-
plicit limit has been where product merges into service. Sellers of ser-
vices are generally liable only for negligence.108 Obviously, definitional
problems arise with regard to credit reports. Are they a finished
product or an investigatory service? There have been several ap-
proaches to the distinction between product and service.
One early case held that the word "product" imports an article
which is made of something and which when made has characteristics
which are apparent to the senses.10D In another case, Gagne v. Bertran,11
plaintiff sued a test hole driller for breach of implied warranty. De-
fendant had been hired to dig test holes in certain land for the depth
of land fill and report to plaintiff, who bought the land relying on the
findings. The court stated that implied warranties are not confined to
transactions involving the sale or furnishing of tangible chattels.111
But analogizing to cases of doctors, lawyers and accountants, the court
ruled that defendant was selling services, as evidenced by the fact that
he was paid by the hour.
112
However, although private investigators charge by the hour, credit
bureaus do not. Uniformly they charge a price per report. Although
some credit bureaus do undertake individual investigations on request,
most sell the reports they have on file and accumulate new ones. If
107. The speed of the expansion can be seen in the rapid transformation of section
402A. The sixth draft, 1961, limited liability to "food for human consumption." The
next draft (No. 7, 1962) included "other products for intimate bodily use." Tentative
draft 10, 1964, reached "any 
product."
108. The liability of certified public accountants is an example of the negligence
standard for sellers of services. See, e.g., Ultamares v. Touche, 5 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 44
(1931); Escott v. BarChirs, Construction Co., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653
(1957). The few cases discussing the difference between product and service involve statu-
tory or contractual construction, not products liability. In Great Western Broadcasting
Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (1962), it was contended that a television station's advertising
time is a product. It was held to be a service since the terni was distinguished from
the phrase "tangible articles" which appeared several times in the statute being inter-
preted. But the court went on to say that
In its broadest sense the term 'product' denotes anything which is produced, and
since economic activity includes the rendition of services, it is appropriate, where
the context otherwise permits, to refer to a completed service as a product.
Id. at 595.
109. Elder v. State, 162 Ala. 41, 50 So. 370 (1909).
110. 43 Cal. 2d 481, 486, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954).
111. Id. at 486, 275 P.2d at 19.
112. Id. at 486, 275 P.2d at 20.
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they do not have the report a customer wants they simply report "no
report on X." Credit reports do not seem to be services by the Gagne
criterion.
Other cases dealing with distinctions between goods and services
ask the question whether there is a sale of goods which must comply
with the Statute of Frauds. Courts facing product/service distinctions
may look to the sale of goods tests for guidance.
One test widely applied in sale of goods question is:
"If the contract be such that, when carried out, it would result in
the sale of a chattel" it is a sale of goods.
"If the result of the contract is that the party has done work and
labor which ends in nothing that can become the subject of a
sale" it is a contract for services.113
By this chattel standard, the credit report transaction would be the
sale of a product rather than a contract for services, because the end-
result of the productive process is an item of personal property which
the bureau sells many times.
Another, more intuitive, sale of goods test asks not whether there is
a sale of a chattel, but "whether work is the essence of the contract or
whether it is the materials supplied."' 14 The case which propounded
this test gave the example of a work of art, in which one pays for the
artist's time and talent, not for smeared paint or chipped rock. The
test is whether the buyer seeks primarily the component elements of
the thing bought or the identity of the producer and his unique
production process. These are often inseparable, however, and the
buyer seeks both. Arguably, the "essence" of the credit report is the
materials--the information supplied-but the collection process and
the collector are also important. The "essence test" is too imprecise to
give much guidance for products liability.'"
Although the question is dose, credit reports seem to fall on the
products side regardless of which of the existing approaches is adopted.
Reports have characteristics which are apparent to the senses. The price
of a report is computed on the basis of finished work, not per unit of
the producer's time, and the transaction involves the sale of a chattel.
In order to be protected by products liability the injured person must
113. Lee v. Griffin, I B. 9- S. 272, 277, 121 Eng. Rep. 716, 718 (1861); 2 A. CormN,
CoNmAcrs § 476 (1950).
114. Clay v. Yates, H. & N. 73, 75, 156 Eng. Rep. 1128, 1125 (1856).
115. Despite its vagueness, or perhaps because of it, several courts have used this test
in rejecting implied warranties. Ladd v. Reed, 320 Mrich. 167, 30 N.V.2d 822 (1958);
York Heating Co. v. Flanneryo 87 Pa. Super. 19 (1926).
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be a consumer or user of the product.116 This limitation is based on
the seller's ability to foresee the use to which the product will be put,
and the persons most directly endangered if the product is defective.
Liability is imposed on the producer so that losses may be spread as
widely as possible consistent with our accident deterrence goals. Thus,
producers must cover the losses of persons whose direct contact with
the product is reasonably foreseeable as being intended by the buyer.
The foreseeability requirement is more a matter of policy than of fact.
It represents the belief that responsibility must be cut off at some
point, and that the arbitrary point chosen should not cut off from re-
covery the persons most seriously endangered by a defect.
Among those foreseeable as users are those "who are passively enjoy-
ing the benefit of the product, as in the cases of passengers in auto-
mobiles and airplanes.""' 7 Others protected as users were a dentist's
patient, injured when a defective hypodermic needle broke off in his
mouth, 18 and the beauty parlor patron, injured by unsafe hair
products." 9 These, like the subject of the credit report, are persons
whose contact with the product is intended by the buyer when the pur-
chase is made. Credit reports are consumed in the active sense by the
credit grantor, but the subject is a passive beneficiary of the product,
because the report is bought for use in a transaction with him. If the
car maker can foresee that persons other than the buyer will ride in the
car, and can evaluate the risks accordingly, the credit bureau should, as
a matter of policy, be found to "foresee" the unavoidable contact be-
tween buyer, report and subject.
The final element of the products liability action is injury. One
troublesome question is the kind of injuries for which recovery will be
allowed. When food was the only product covered by strict liability,
liability was limited to physical injury to the person. Liability was
extended to physical injury to property when pet food makers were
held strictly liable. 2 0 This extension has been made because any de-
fective product can be harmful. And while the consumer's physical
116. This is necessarily an overgeneralzation. See note 105 supra.
117. RsrATEmT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs, Explanatory Notes, § 402A, comment 1 at 854
(1965).
118. Magrine v. Spector, 100 NJ. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 631 (1968).
119. Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965).
120. McAfee v. Cargil Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Thus, the physical injury
limitation is basically historical. The type of damages allowed has followed the kind of
injuries which give a legal cause of action. If economic losses caused by defective products
are otherwise within the policy of products liability, the physical injury rule Is Irrelevant
and should be disregarded.
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safety is paramount, his property interests are also deserving of protec-
don against the risks created by others.
While recovery for purely economic loss is often permitted under
implied warranty,"' the second Restatement of Torts extends strict
tort liability only for physical harm to the user or his property."" Thus,
the manufacturer's liability for economic loss would be excluded in
jurisdictions following this section strictly when no physical injury
accompanies it. Two leading jurisdictions have dashed over this issue.
California followed the Restatement of Torts section 402A in Seely
v. White Motor Co."13 by limiting strict tort liability to physical in-
jury to the user and his property. It reasoned that economic losses
are basically commercial and should be recoverable only on the basis
of warranty. However, in Santor v. Karagheusian,12 4 New Jersey re-
fused to apply a physical damage limitation. The court stated that
strict liability is based on the producer's responsibility for defects, not
on the categorization of damages, and if the manufacturer is to be
made liable for the damage his products do to a user he should be liable
for all of it.
The New Jersey rule is preferable because it is grounded in the
policy objectives of enterprise liability-to make the cost of accidents
part of the price of the product, thereby reducing the number of
accidents, and spreading all losses as widely as possible. It is not de-
pendent on an artificial distinction between damages of a commercial
or noncommercial nature, a distinction which has only a tenuous
basis in history and policy. 2 5 The risk to the subject and his property
121. Spence v. Three River Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 853 Mich. 720. 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Lang v.
General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N. Dak. 1965); Continental Copper and Steel
Indus. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). The earliest
case to throw out privity also gave damages for loss of profits and goodwill. Mazettl v.
Armour Co., 75 Wash. 622, 1M P. 633 (1913).
Some courts have held that economic damages are recoverable under implied warranty,
but only where there is privity. Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965). Kker v.
General Motors Corp., 214 Tenn. 521, 381 S.NV.2d 884 (1964).
122. See note 105 supra.
123. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
124. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
125. In Seely, supra note 123, the court's main concern, and the troublesome problem
with purely economic damages, is determining what is a defect when goods detiriorate.
The problem would have been presented in Karagheusian, supra note 124, had the carpet
simply worn out rather than having developed a large, visible line down the center. In
cases where the question is what is a defect, the problem is a contractual one, ix. what
did the parties bargain for. The expectations of the parties should govern and a physical
injury limitation is defensible. Mistaken credit reports, however, do not present this
problem, for normally there is no problem identifying a defect, and the bureau would
never claim that the parties had bargained for a defective report. In cases like these, the
difficult problem the California court sought to avoid would not be present, and the
physical damage limitation should not be applied.
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created by the erroneous credit report is not physical. But it is direct
and economic. It endangers the subject's income-producing capacity,
his economic condition, his ability to enter contractual relations, and
his personal reputation. It would be illogical and unfair to allow
recovery for economic loss caused by an erroneous report when the
anxiety over it causes an ulcer, but to deny it when it does not. In
jurisdictions following Karagheusian or allowing recovery for purely
economic loss in implied warranty, economic damages done by er-
roneous credit report would be recoverable, notwithstanding the ab.
sence of physical injury.
One potential difference between strict tort liability and implied
tort warranty is the possibility that a defendant may disclaim the war-
ranty. 26 When privity of contract was required, this was often an
effective defense to an implied warranty action. But courts began to
refuse on public policy grounds to bind the user of a product by a
disclaimer he had never seen or assented to.12 7 With the elimination
of privity and the recognition that warranty is not a matter of contract,
a contractual disclaimer should have no effect, and one view of the
area is that
so far as strict liability of the manufacturer is concerned, no re-
liance can be placed upon any disclaimer.
12 8
Of course, there are jurisdictions which hold to the contrary,28 and
it is still unclear whether limitations on damages set by the manufac-
turers are enforceable when disclaimers are not.1 30
Thus, credit reporting bureaus may be vulnerable to suit in implied
warranty or strict liability as well as defamation. However, opening
the courts to suits grounded on an erroneous credit report would not
afford every injured person a remedy. These tort actions do not reach
126. See UNmFOaM COMMERMCAL CODE § 2-316, which opens the way to modification of
warranties.
127. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 528, 161 A.2d 69 (1960): Jolly v.
C.E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 211 P. 748 (1922). See also Kessler, Contracts of Ad.
hesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract 43 COLUm. L. REy. 629 (1943).
128. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 832-34.
129. Rozen v. Chrysler Corp., 142 So. 2d 735 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). It is still
generally a good defense to the retail dealer on a direct sale to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Alaska Pac. Salmon Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 163 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1947). But caseg
such as Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964) struck this defense down as contrary to public policy where the product is dangerous
to human safety.
130. This would be illogical but possible, since courts have been more lenient toward
the manufacturer's attempt to limit recoverable damages under a warranty than toward
the attempt to exclude warranty altogether. See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Horkamus Corp.,
341 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1965). But there will be no assent to either limitation In the cage
of a distant consumer or user.
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secrecy, or the harms of coercion, or improper dissemination.131 Prob-
lems of proving falsity, causation,lm or damagesi3 would occasionally
be considerable.
V. Legislative Reform
Because of these limitations, reliance on existing or developing tort
remedies alone to solve the problems caused by credit reports would
be misplaced. The remedies will be useful only if bureau secrecy is
prohibited, for recourse to the courts requires information not easily
obtained by concerned individuals. Legal remedies unaccompanied
by legislative regulation of credit bureaus might simply increase in-
dustry secrecy. Further, tort actions are remedial, and emphasis on
prevention is needed. Definitive standards of operation and disclosure
would reduce the incidence of injury by providing for record correc-
tion before use, not afterwards. These standards would also be aimed
at reducing the types of injury tort actions cannot: coercion by un-
scrupulous businessmen, and improper dissemination of reports.
The fundamental problem is one of determining the proper mix of
specific and general deterrence. The first national standards, the first
federal attempt at "specific" deterrence, are set forth in the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) which went into effect on April 25, 1971.1'3
The FCRA requires credit bureaus to:
(1) Follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of information;
(2) Disclose to the consumer, upon request, the "nature, sub-
stance" and sources of information in the file, and recipients of
the report within the preceding six months;
131. See pp. 1038-1060 supra.
132. Legal cause varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Each would continue to apply
its own rule.
133. Determining damages to the financially ruined plaintiff requires an estimate of
total loss of income and economic opportunity for a period with a residual loss for
a period thereafter. When the loss is marginal, damages would cover the difference in
income, cost or terms caused by the report. Thus, if the subject sought a car loan from
a bank at 5% and a false report prevented him from getting it, and he had to borrow
at 18% from a finance company, he could recover the difference. The most difficult
problem is estimating pure loss of opportunity. What is the right to credit worth? It
would require some estimate of the economic value of the use of those things he would
have bought during the period he was foreclosed. Thus, if plaintiff would have bought
a car, but was prevented from doing so for two years, he would be entitled to the lost
value of the use of the car for the period. Proof would be most difficult when the
application was to open an account, not to buy a specific item. Courts have faced issues
like this before, however, and would apply their own defamation and products liability
damages rules.
134. Fair Credit Reporting Act, §§ 601-622, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1631-1681t (Supp. 1971).
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(3) Provide an opportunity for a subject to challenge the com-
pleteness or accuracy of any item in his file, to record the dispute
if it is not resolved, and to correct any error;
(4) Limit access to credit reports to those with a court order, the
consumer's consent, or "a legitimate business need for the infor-
mation";
(5) Delete adverse information which is 7-14 years old;
(6) Notify the subject when detrimental public information is
included in a report to be used for employment purposes, or to
make sure that the information is current.18 5
Government administration of the Act and bureau compliance with
it will be expensive. The cost is both tertiary and primary. This sec-
tion of the Note will indicate possible ways in which the current
legislation could be improved, changes which would obviously entail
increased costs. The costs of these alterations cannot be accurately
quantified here. Thus, the suggested changes-while not seeking to
prevent mistakes at any cost-are based, first, on the belief that the
FCRA will provide little accident prevention at present cost levels and,
second, on the "rough guess" that the increased cost of the changes, to
either the government or the bureaus, would be more than recovered in
the resulting reduction in primary costs, the number and expense of ac-
cidents. Considerations of equity are also relevant to the cost issue
which is present throughout this section, for the amount one is willing
to spend depends upon how much one cares about protecting the
subject of the credit report from harm. This Note has argued that
fairness requires letting the consumer see and challenge his credit
record, have recourse against bureaus for injury and place reasonable
limits on access to the report. If the net effect of the stricter regulations
suggested below were to increase the total of accident and avoidance
costs, then this Note would urge the Congress or state legislatures to
make the value judgment that greater protection is "more fair" and
thus worth the extra money.
The Act will be evaluated in terms of four problems: How well does
the Act establish the subject's right to (1) be notified of the existence
of the report and inspect it; (2) correct or explain detrimental en-
tries; (3) control access to the report; and (4) be protected by the Act
while still pursuing common law remedies.
135. This is a summary. For the full text, see §§ 601-622, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-1681t
(Supp. 1971).
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A. Notification and Right to Inspect
Statutory regulation ought first to establish the subject's right to
inspect his credit record. Bureaus could be required to send a report
to every subject periodically, to send reports only to those whose files
contain detrimental items, or to notify the subject of the location of
the report and his right to inspect it. Alternatively, the burden could
be placed on the credit grantor to notify the subject when he is denied
credit on the basis of the report and to give him the name and address
of the bureau that supplied the report which would then be required
to let him see it.
The choice involves a trade-off of effective prevention of accidents
against administrative and policing expense. Requiring reports to be
sent only to those with negative material in the files would involve
sending fewer reports, but the cost of determining which files to send
might exceed the cost of sending them all, and a large policing effort
to set and enforce standards would be required.130 Notifying the sub-
ject of the location and right to inspect the report involves lower cost
to the bureau, and little policing since there is no discretionary factor.
It would be much less effective since not everyone would take the time
and trouble to inspect his record. Placing the reporting responsibility
on the report user would be wholly inadequate. The erroneous report
would be received and acted upon before the notification and cor-
rection process would begin. Effective specific deterrence prevents
accidents. It doesn't merely try to minimize the harm after the accident
occurs. In many cases, the harm would consist of extensive delay and
loss of opportunity before the mistake was rectified, if it could be. In
cases where the object of regulation is to remove prejudicial or inap-
propriate material before the report is circulated, the harm cannot be
undone. The policing problem would be large, since there would
normally be several excuses for rejection. Most creditors do not cur-
rently notify rejected applicants. They would avoid the responsibility
whenever possible. Since the record will come to the surface eventu-
ally, it should be exposed when prevention is easiest and most effective.
The most effective and expensive method would be to require the
bureau to send a copy of the report to each subject. But by sending the
136. The cost of this method would vary with the method of record.keeping In each
bureau. Computerized bureaus with appropriate progms would be able to retrieve
selectively without high selection cost. The burden on bureaus without suitable progam-
ring or still using paper files would be overwhelming.
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report before it is used the bureaus would prevent many cases of dam-
age and their accompanying lawsuits.1 7
Bureaus could also be required to notify the subject of any detri-
mental item which is entered in his record after he has seen the report,
thereby alerting him to the possible need for correction of the rec-
ord. 18 Effective primary cost reduction requires that the correction
process be a continuous one because the information collection process
is. One way to meet the need for continuing notice is to require
bureaus to send the reports to each subject periodically, perhaps every
six months, or once a year. Without some kind of continuous notice
a prudent subject will have to examine his file regularly-an expensive,
time-consuming, and wasteful method. Few will or could reasonably
be expected to do so.
Under the FCRA users of credit reports are required to notify the
subject of the name and address of the credit bureau when credit,
employment, or insurance is denied, or the terms are made less
favorable "either wholly or partly" because of the report.18 Although
the subject may request disclosure of information from the bureau at
any time, the Act does not require the bureau even to notify subjects
of the location of the report. This omission emasculates the disclosure
requirement. For the reasons elaborated above, total reliance on the
credit grantor to notify is the least satisfactory of the possible methods.
While under the Act the credit bureau must disclose the nature,
substance and sources of the information contained in the files upon de-
mand,140 it apparently need not let the subject read the report. Further,
the sources of information about the subject's "character, general
reputation, personal characteristics and mode of living" need not be
revealed. 141 The identity of the source is essential to any attempt to
rebut the statements, which may be based on bad motive, lack of op-
portunity to observe, or similar grounds. Both accuracy and fairness
require that this information be disclosed. 42 The only information
137. There is potentially a free rider problem-the use by the consumer of the report
he has been furnished for future credit reference. This could be prevented by a certiflca'
tion of copies system similar to college transcripts.
138. In some cases the problem of defining "detrimental" exists. For instance, the
statement that the subject was sued on a debt and won, ostensibly positive, is detrimental
because lenders don't want to lend to "troublemakers." If discretion as to which items
must be reported is left to the bureau, extensive policing will be required.
139. Fair Credit Reporting Act § 615, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681m(a) (Supp. 1971).
140. Id. 33 609(a)(I), (2), (3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681g(a)(1), (2) (3) (Supp. 1971)
141. Id. § 609(a)(2), 15 U.S.CA. § 1681g(a)(2) (Supp. 1971).
142. The contrary argument is that persons might not give information If their names
are revealed. The answer to this is that they are protected from legal liability by the
conditional privilege to encourage them to speak. It has not been, and in fairness to
the subject, should not be, legal policy to protect informants from social liability.
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which the bureau must release on its own initiative is detrimental
public record information furnished for employment purposes. The
subject must be notified that the information is being reported by the
bureau at the time it is reported.143 Even this can be circumvented if
the bureau has procedures to keep the information "current."' 44
Bureaus will rarely choose to notify. There seems to be no reason why
only sensitive public information in employment reports need be cur-
rent or reported to the subject. But the most critical limitation is that
the subject need never be notified when a report containing detrimen-
tal private information is being sent to a user, and there is no require-
ment to keep it current either. Thus, under the Act, a person must be
notified that an arrest for reckless driving is being reported to a
potential employer (if the bureau has no procedure to make sure the
report is current), but the person need not be informed of a "no-pay"
report by a merchant. These problems drastically reduce the effective-
ness of the statute.
B. Right to Correct or Explain
The second statutory policy ought to be the subject's right to have
mistakes corrected, misleading entries explained or clarified, and
irrelevant or obsolete data deleted. Mistakes should be corrected
promptly, with the responsibility on the bureau to investigate any
alleged mistake. Subjects should be allowed to explain any item they
believe is incomplete or misleading, and the explanation should be-
come part of the report. Thus, for example, if a merchant reports the
subject is a "no-pay," the subject's explanation that he refused to pay
because the merchandise was defective must be included.
Some items are so damaging to credit applicants that their use
should be allowed only when the bureau has been required to check
the entry for completeness between the request for and issuance of the
report. These include notation of arrest without conviction, indict-
ment, liens, lawsuits filed and judgments on appeal.
In case of a dispute over the accuracy or completeness of any item,
the FCRA requires the bureau to investigate, unless it
has reasonable grounds to believe that the dispute by the consumer
is frivolous or irrelevant. ... The presence of contradicting in-
formation in the consumer's file does not in and of itself consti-
143. Id. § 613(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681k(l) (Supp. 1971).
144. Id. § 613(a), 15 US.CA. § 1681k(2) (Supp. 1971).
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tute reasonable grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous or
irrelevant.1 "
4
Standards of relevance or frivolity are left to the bureau. Credit
bureaus consider the buyer's claim of defective merchandise to be ir-
relevant to his refusal to pay.' 46 If this claim need not be investigated,
recorded, or reported, few objections to the report will be "relevant."
The requirement that the bureau record the dispute after investiga-
don is subject to the same "standards."'147
The standard of currency employed in the act is seven to fourteen
years.148 This is, arguably, much longer than required to give a com-
prehensive report and makes it very difficult for a person to make up
for and forget past mistakes. These limits do not apply in several
situations, including reports used for employment in jobs paying over
$20,000 per year. 49 Although any time limit is arbitrary, a time limit
of two to three years might strike a better balance between the grant-
or's right to learn of, and the subject's right to leave behind, things of
the past.
C. Controlling Access to the Report
Third, access to the subject's report must be limited to those with a
"legitimate business interest" in it. To avoid the existing abuses of
excessive dissemination, the subject should be the judge of legitimacy.
Credit reporting bureaus could be allowed to release reports only to
persons who state that they have the subject's consent. Despite the
fact that consent is often pro forma, this rule, at a minimum, would
insure notice to the person that he may be investigated, and allow him
to withdraw from the transaction if he finds the investigation overly
objectionable. The subject will give his consent to someone who has
a legitimate business interest in the report. Arguably, no one else is
entitled to it without his consent. Each credit report should contain a
list of those to whom it was furnished. By inspecting the report which
could be sent to him periodically, the subject would discover whether
there were any unconsented-to disclosures. The report buyer could be
made liable for procuring the report without consent, and the bureau
could be made liable if it released the report without assurance of
consent.
145. Id. § 611(a), 15 U.S.CA. § 1681i(a) (Supp. 1971).
146. See note 14 supra.
147. Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 611(b)-(c), 15 US.C.A. §§ 1681i(b)-(c) (Supp. 1971).
148. Id. § 605, 15 US.C.A. § 1681c (Supp. 1971).
149. Id. § 605(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c(b)(3) (Supp. 1971).
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Although the FCRA requires the bureaus to keep records of those
who use a report, the statute requires the subject's consent only when
there is no "legitimate business interest"5 0 on the part of the buyer,
tested by the bureau's standards. Given the promiscuity with which
the bureaus currently apply this standard,15' this limitation is useless.
D. Protection Under the Act and Common Law Remedies
Finally, statutory sanctions would be ineffective without an enforce-
ment mechanism. A federal administrative agency should set and
police compliance procedures. Since litigation is costly and time con-
suming for all parties, there should be an administrative mechanism
for prompt settlement of minor grievances. For example, the question
whether the bureau has charged the subject an unreasonable fee to see
his file would be neither economically feasible nor worthy of a court's
time. An informal administrative hearing would resolve such matters
expeditiously. A federal cause of action should be provided for persons
claiming non-compliance with the Act or presenting questions of
statutory construction. Finally, any disclosures made pursuant to the
Act should be usable as the basis for, or as evidence in, state common
law actions, so that the use of the latter actions would not be frustrated
by continued secrecy by the bureaus.152
The FCRA makes credit bureaus liable only for willful or negligent
failure to comply with the Act. 53 Thus, civil liability is dependent
upon either showing intentional violation or meeting a standard of
proof that is usually insurmountable.154
The entire liability scheme is weak, and in some ways counter-pro-
ductive. The credit bureau discharges its obligation to the subject by
following "reasonable procedures"'55 to make reports accurate, divul-
ging the contents of his file on request and correcting errors or record-
ing disputes. The report user discharges his obligation by maintaining
"reasonable procedures"'156 to assure notification. Thus, if a reasonably
accurate credit bureau sends an erroneous report to a user which has
reasonable notification procedures, but which fails to notify, neither is
liable under the FCRA This, notwithstanding the damage done to
the subject, the failure to notify, and the subject's uninterrupted ig-
150. Id. § 60(3)(E), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 b(3)(E) (Supp. 1971).
151. See p. 1040 supra.
152. See TAN 11-15, 21-29 supra.
153. Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 616, 617, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681n, 1631o (Supp. 1971).
154. See note 87 supra.
155. Fair Credit Reporting Act 5 607(a), 15 US.C.A. § 16S1c(a) (Supp. 1971).
156. Id. § 615(c), 15 US.C.A. § 1681m(c) (Supp. 1971).
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norance of the location, contents and use of the report. As regards the
report user, this is a lower standard of care than negligence, for if it
has reasonable procedures there is no liability for occasions of negligent
failure to follow them.15 7 If the subject is notified by the user, he must
go back to the bureau, and must after "a reasonable period of time
(for the bureau) to investigate,"'5 8 argue about the report. No matter
what the damage, delay, inconvenience and lost opportunity, no one
is liable.
The problem does not end here, however, because the law also
provides that
no consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of
defamation, invasion of privacy or negligence with respect to the
reporting of information against any consumer reporting agency
(or) any user of information ... based on information disclosed
pursuant (to the Act) except as to false information furnished
with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.159
This provision will interfere with common law remedies where they
are available. The subject may sue the bureau based on common law,
but he may not "base the action" on information disclosed under the
FCRA unless he is trying to prove malice against a conditionally privi-
leged bureau. This creates an awkward dilemma. If the subject re-
ceives no information under the FCRA, he may sue the credit bureau
under common law, but secrecy makes this unlikely and impractical.
On the other hand, if the subject is notified and receives disclosure
under the Act, he may not use the information in a state civil suit,
other than for malicious defamation, even when there is no federal
cause of action. This part of the Act will harm rather than help the
consumer.
Finally, enforcement and procedural rules are left to the Federal
Trade Commission,6 0 and a violation of the law or rules is an unfair
trade practice under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC has tre-
mendous leeway and little guidance in setting compliance and en-
forcement procedures. Close supervision and regulation will be neces.
sary, for credit reporting bureaus will resist restriction strongly.
157. Id. §§ 606(c), 615(c), 15 U.S.CA. §§ 1681d(c), 1681m(c) (Supp. 1971).
158. Id. § 611(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681i(a) (Supp. 1971).
159. Id. § 610(e), 15 U.S.CA. § 1681h(e) (Supp. 1971).
160. Id. § 621(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s(a) (Supp. 1971).
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Adequate legislative standards are basically preventive, while tort
actions are primarily remedial. But since even tightly drawn standards
will not prevent all injury, an action in tort must be available for the
injured. Likewise, since no tort action, however liberally construed,
will provide relief to every injured party, a barrier to injury must be
erected. Both approaches are necessary if legal accountability is to be
imposed, at last, on credit reporting bureaus.
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